Nash equilibria for strategic gamces u~ere characterized by as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality.
Introduction
The starting point for this work was an attempt to see whether the axiomatizations for Nash equilibria given in and in Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996) , could be adapted to get axiomatizations for e-equilibria also.
In it was proved that (OPR) (One Person Rationality), (CONS) (Consistency) and (COCONS) (Converse Consistency) can be used to provide an axiomatic characterization for Nash equilibria (briefly: NE). We refer to that paper for motivation and references to related work. Further references, in which the above mentioned results have been extended, are: Norde, Potters, Reijnierse and Vermeulen (1996), Peleg and Sudhdlter (1994) and Shinotsuka (1994) .
Looking for a characterization of E-NE, it was clear that the key point was to replace (OPR) by (E-OPR). By (OPR}, in it was named the requirement that for 1-person games the solution to be characterized coincides with payoff maximization.
Clearly, (e-OPR) should mean that for 1-person games we look for e-maximizers instead of maximizers.
Being interested also in other kinds of appro3cimate NE, like the (e-k)-NE introduced in Lucchetti. Patrone and Tijs (1986) , and studied also in Jurg and Tijs (1993) and Norde and Potters (1995) , we looked at a unified way to achieve this kind of axiomatic characterizations.
The solution is simple: it is sufficient to introduce a(possibly personalized) "choice rule" p for all of the potential players, and to substitute a conveniently defined (7~-OPR) for (OPR). In this way, we get the axiomatic characterizations of NE and of the various kinds of approximate NE in which we were interested: the distinction between the various solution concepts is simply done by means of an appropriate choice of the choice rules p.
To be more detailed, by means of a set P of choice rules p we define P-NE. Then, P-NE is characterized by (P-OPR), (CONS) and (COCONS). Furthermore, it is proved that under mild conditions every solution satisfying (CONS) and (COCONS) is in fact a P-NE, for an appropriate family~of choice rules p: so, P-NE appear to be all of the solutions which can be considered if we want to respect consistency (direct and converse).
Also a characterization of~-NE is provided by means of (~-OPR), (NEI`1) (non emptiness) and (CONS), along the lines of Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996).
P-Nash equilibria
The main tool to define~-NE is the "choice rule" that was mentioned in the introduction.
Actually, it will be assumed that different players may have different choice rules: i.e.,
we are prepared to consider "personalized" choice rules, which is reflected in the name of -NE.
Definition 2.1 A choice rule is a pair (U, p), where:
-U is a nonempty set of real valued functions -p is a map that to every u E U, u: A-~R, associates a subset p(u) of A.
Remark 2.1 We (implicitly) assume that every function u E U is defined on a nonempty set. We do not assume that p(u)~0. -
The definition says, in words, that the rule (U,p) "chooses", for a given function u, a subset of A, the domain of u. Usually, we shall refer to the rule simply by p. The set U will be called the domain of the rule.
For ease of reference, we shall use also the notation p(A, u), where A stands for the domain of the function u. Clearly superfluous, but useful to give "a name" to the domain of u.
Before providing some examples, we introduce the following compatibility condition: 
Clearly condition (CC) excludes a too wild behavior for the choice rule: it means a sort of "independence of irrelevant details", and will provide to be very useful in the characterizations we shall prove in the following sections.
Notice that (CC) has nothing to do with utility transformations that leave the preferences unaffected. About preferences, let us point out that we could have considered choice rules based on preferences, instead of (utility) functions: however, for definiteness, we shall not pursue this point of view. 
Then, á is a P-NE if á E p;(A;, v,;) for every i E N. Following this approach, which is also
coherent with the definition of reduced game (see Definition 3.1), one can get rid of (CC).
Doing so, one should be careful not to confuse u; with u;, since the "preferred elements"
chosen by means of p; need not to be the same. V Example 2.2 Let G be a game. If the class U is conveniently chosen (e.g.: it contains all of the u; and all of their restrictions to subsets of A, so that condition (2.1) is satisfied), then P-NE corresponding to the case in which all of the players use the choice rule described in (a) of Example 2.1 are just the Nash equilibria, while the case in which all use the rule (c) gives rise to e-NE.
-, Example 2.3 Let G be a semi-infinite bimatrix game. Assume that U is chosen as in the previous example. Then, the definition of weakly determined game, given in Lucchetti,
Patrone and Tijs (1986), can be given using the rules described in cases (c) and (d) of It is now time to introduce ( P-OPR). Before doing so, we shall put some restrictions on the class of games that we consider.
We shall assume that there is given~1~, a set of potential players, and that for every i E N there is given a choice rule (U" p;).
We shall consider classes of games G s.t. for every G -(N, (A;);EN, ( v,;)iE,v) E 9,
N C~~V.
On such classes of games, we shall say that a solution~satisfies personalized oneperson rationality if the following holds: (P-OPR)~f or every i E N, and for every game G-({i}, A, u) E Q we have that u E U; and q(G) -p;(A, u)
Vl'e can now state the following 
Then, a solution o on C is the P-NE if and only if o satisfies ('P-OPR), (CONS) and (COCONS).

It is straightforward to verify that P-NE satisfies (P-OPR), (CON5) and (COCONS).
Notice that, to achieve (CONS) and (COCONS), conditions (CLOS) and (2.1) guarantee that the appropriate choice rules can be applied; while (CC) implies that the choice rules work in an appropriate way.
For the converse, the key argument is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let Q be a family ofgames satisfying (CLOS). Let~1, yh2 be solutions ons
.t.~,1 satisfies (P-OPR) and (CONS), while tfi2 satisfies (P-OPR) and (COCONS). Then,~~4
2.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Since P-NE satisfies all of the three properties, this Lemma gives us, for b in Theorem 3.1, both 4 C~-NE and P-NE C p. Hence, the proof of Theorem 3.1.
-P roof of Lemma 3.1. By induction on the number of players. For card(N) -1, it is guaranteed by (P-OPR); we have even equality of the sets.
Assume that~1(H) C 4z(H) for every game H s.t. card(N(H)) C k. We shall prove that for every game G s.t. card(N(G)) -k-}-1 we have~1(G) C~z(G).
Let i E~1(G). By (CLOS), Gs~i E 9 for every S s.t. S C N, S~{0, N}. By (CONS), xs E~1(Gs~2). So, by the induction hypothesis,~1(GS~Í) C~2(Gs.z). But (COCONS) guarantees that i E~z(G). p
The proofs of Theorem 3.1 and of Lemma 3.1 show that (P-OPR) lies, so to say, in the background. It has some kind of parametric róle. In other words, everything is pointing to the fact that a solution satisfying (CONS) and (COCONS) should be some kind of P-NE.
Actually, the following result is an instance of the principle sketched above. It is stated in a special class to avoid too many technical details. Furthermore, we shall confine to solutions and choice rules which satisfy a compatibility condition. This condition is essentially the same for both. To be more precise, for the solution o we shall ask for the following property, that is essentially an adaptation of (CC) for games. We have:
fi(T) -a..fr(~1) -7.Ír(B) -:3 .fir(L) -rl, Ïrr(C) -~, frr(R) -Ã
nd so, since (T. L) and (Al, C) are NE for G, (a, rl) and (7.~) are NE for H.T 
C~, satisfying (CONS) and (COCONS).
Ifo satis6es (CC~), then b determines, by one-person games, a uniaue family of choice rules (pt)t.,ti-defined on ZlF and satisfying (CC). llloreover, ó is the T-NE determined by these choice rules.
Proof. Let i E.1~, A be a finite set and let u: A-~R. Define p;(A, u) -q({i}, A, u).
Such p; satisfies (CC).
By definition of p;, clearly~satisfies (P-OPR) w.r.t. this family of choice rules.
Since by assumption~satisfies also (CONS) and (COCONS), thanks to Theorem
we have that cy -~-NE. p
Let us notice at this point that, since perfect NE do not satisfy (CONS), they cannot be~-NE. The same is true for other refinements of NE which do not satisfy (CON5): see Example 2.4 of .
One word on the independence of the properties (P-OPR), (CONS) and (COCONS).
Again, examples 2.16 and 2.17 from show that neither ( and (COCONS), we have actually that~-P-NE, for p given as in Example 2.1 (b).
Referring to once more, we point out that it is possible to extend to this setting also their results on the extensive form games: in particular, defining P-SPE (that is, P-subgame perfect equilibrium).
We end this section providing an example of a solution which is not a~-NE. This solution could be seen as a refinement of the (~-k)-NE which correspond to the P-NE induced by the choice rule described in Example 2.1 (e). G, x) with G E G and x E 4(G).
Two nodes ( H, y) and ( K, z) in the graph are connected if K is a reduced game of H, given y. That is:
Also the following property was introduced in Peleg, Potters and Tijs ( 1996).
Definition 4.1 The graph Graph(G, o) has the ancestor property if.. (AP) for every (G. x) E Graph(~, ó), there is a game H E~s.t. for every y E o(H) the vertex (H, y) is connected with (G. x).
It is easy to notice that Theorem 1 of Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996) holds also if we drop any reference to (OPR). That is, we can prove the following theorem. Before that, a piece of notation: if a solution o on a class G is nonempty valued, we shall say that ó satisfies (NEAI).
Theorem 4.1 Let C be a dass of games, and let o be a solution on~. satisfying (NElli) and (CONS).
If o is a solution on G which satisfies (AP), then o is minimal (on G, w.r.t. incl usion)
in the ctass of solutions on Q which satisfy (NEhT) and (CONS).
Proof. Let o be given, which satisfies (NEI~I) and (CONS), s.t. o C ó. We shall prove that~-o.
Let G E G and x E q(G). Consider H, whose existence is guaranteed by (AP and (AP) on C.
If q is a solution on G that satisfies (NEM), (CONS) and ('P-OPR), then o -P-NE.
Proof. Since~satisfies (P-OPR) and (CONS), while P-NE satisfies (P-OPR) and (COCONS), we have that~C P-NE by Lemma 3.1.
But P-NE on G satisfies (CONS) and (NEh1). Since we assumed also that P-NE satisfies (AP) on C, thanks to Theorem 4.1 we can conclude that P-NE is minimal on Q
w.r.t. (NEh~) and (CONS). So, P-NE -q o
We shall now see how to extend Theorem 3-a of Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1996). To simplify, we shall assume that every player in .1( has its choice rule with domain U~. We shall, furthermore, assume that all of these rules satisfy (CC). We need a further restriction on these rules. (c), when e~0, it is sufficient to take ;3 -0 and -y -2e. Notice that the functions u considered in (SP) fail to be continuous on "nice" topological spaces (e.g., an interval of the reals), so that this road is barred if one is interested in extending the result that we shall give to a context like those studied in Peleg and Sudhólter (1994) or in Norde,
Potters, Reijnierse and Vermeulen (1996) .
